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   Clare	   is	   contemplating	   an	   historic	   journey—a	   journey	   back	   in	   time.	   	   There	  before	  her	  sits	  her	  grand	  invention,	  the	  time	  machine	  itself.	  	  Pristine,	  untested,	  built	  of	  the	  finest	  components	  on	  rock-­‐solid	  theory.	  	  There	  is	  much	  to	  worry	  about	  on	  the	  first	  ever	  time	  travel	  journey,	  even	  with	  the	  very	  best	  of	  machines.	  Accidental	  death	  and	   dismemberment—of	   oneself	   or	   of	   innocent	   bystanders.	   Arrival	   in	   a	   remote	  location	  with	   inadequate	   supplies.	   	   Permanent	   exile	   in	   a	   time	   long	   forgotten.	   	  But	  these	  are	  the	   least	  of	  her	  worries.	  For,	  as	  she	  reflects	  on	  the	  matter,	  Clare	  realizes	  that	  the	  potential	  physical	  disasters	  pale	  in	  comparison	  with	  what	  she	  now	  takes	  to	  be	  a	  very	   likely	  metaphysical	  disaster.	   	  Time	   travel	   threatens	  her	  very	  agency,	  her	  own	  free	  will.	  Not	  only	  hers	  either.	  	  As	  she	  thinks	  the	  matter	  through,	  she	  realizes	  to	  her	  horror	  that	  the	  freedom	  of	  everyone	  temporally	  downstream	  of	  her	  arrival	  is	  at	  stake.	   Let	   us	   peer	   in	   on	  her	   reasoning.	   	   In	   doing	   so,	  we	   shall	   find	   that	   even	   if	  we	  disagree	   with	   her	   conclusions,	   there	   are	   startling	   things	   to	   be	   learned	   about	   the	  relationships	  between	  our	  past,	  our	  causal	  history,	  and	  our	  own	  free	  agency.	  
	  
1.	  	  First,	  some	  background.	  	  	  Clare	  has	  a	  simple	  goal:	  to	  get	  rich.	  Her	  plan	  is	  to	  make	  two	  journeys.	  One	  trip	  will	   take	   her	   to	  December	   1979,	   about	   six	  months	   after	   she	  was	   born,	   to	  make	   a	  $10K	  investment	  in	  Eaton	  Vance	  stock,	  the	  top	  performing	  stock	  between	  1979	  and	  2005	   (the	   year	  when	   she	   began	  work	   on	   her	   time	  machine).1	  	   The	   other	   trip	  will	  take	   her	   to	   2005	   to	   cash	   in	   the	   stock	   and	   put	   the	   proceeds	   in	   an	   offshore	   bank	  account.	   She	   has	   very	   good	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   her	   journey	   will	   be—or	   has	  been—successful.	   	   In	  February	  2005,	  while	  still	   in	  graduate	  school,	   she	  received	  a	  package	  which	  contained	  (a)	  all	  of	  the	  paperwork,	  ostensibly	  signed	  by	  herself	  only	  a	   week	   before,	   for	   the	   offshore	   account,	   (b)	   a	   complete	   explanation	   of	   her	   time	  travel	   journeys	   and	   their	   outcome,	   and	   (c)	   detailed	   plans	   for	   building	   the	   time	  machine	  in	  which	  the	  journeys	  would	  be	  made.	  She	  knew	  that	  it	  could	  be	  a	  hoax—	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ‡	   A	   version	   of	   this	   paper	   was	   read	   at	   a	   colloquium	  meeting	   of	   the	   Philosophy	   Department	   at	   the	  University	  of	  Colorado,	  Boulder,	  and	  discussed	  by	  the	  Metaphysics	  &	  Philosophy	  of	  Religion	  Reading	  Group	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Notre	  Dame.	  	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  members	  of	  both	  groups—especially	  Kenny	  Boyce,	   Amy	   Seymour,	   and	   Meghan	   Sullivan—for	   helpful	   discussion,	   and	   to	   Kathrin	   Koslicki,	   Josh	  Rasmussen,	  and	  Brad	  Rettler,	  and	  for	  helpful	  written	  comments.	   	  Special	   thanks	  to	   Jeff	  Snapper	  for	  extensive	   conversations	   on	   the	   topic	   of	   changing	   the	   past,	   and	   for	   detailed	   written	   comments	   on	  multiple	  versions	  of	  several	  of	  the	  arguments	  in	  this	  paper.	  Thanks	  are	  also	  due	  to	  two	  anonymous	  referees	  for	  this	  journal.	  1	  According	   to	   the	  Eaton	  Vance	  Corp.	  2004	  Annual	  Report,	   “[a]	   $10,000	   investment	   in	   Eaton	   Vance	  stock	   on	   December	   31,	   1979,	   assuming	   reinvestment	   of	   all	   dividends,	   would	   have	   grown	   to	  $10,613,474	  on	  December	  31,	  2004.”	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indeed,	  suspected	  as	  much	  at	  first.	  	  But	  as	  she	  read	  through	  the	  detailed	  notes	  on	  the	  time	   travel	   journey,	   written	   in	   her	   own	   hand	   and	   bearing	   on	   every	   page	   the	  unmistakable	  traces	  of	  her	  very	  own	  dry	  and	  self-­‐deprecating	  sense	  of	  humor,	  she	  was	   soon	   a	   true	   believer.	   In	   short	   order	   she	   quit	   her	   job	   and	   withdrew	   a	   not	  inconsequential	   sum	   of	   money	   from	   the	   offshore	   account	   to	   fund	   what	   would	  become	  an	  eight	  year	  project	  of	  building	  her	   time	  machine	  according	   to	   the	  specs	  she	  had	  been	  given.	  She	  also	  began	  the	  challenging	  task	  of	  rounding	  up	  $10K	  in	  pre-­‐1979	  US	  currency.	  Trouble	  comes	  as	  the	  date	  of	  the	  journey	  approaches	  and	  she	  considers	  the	  question	  of	  what	  would	  happen	  if	  she	  were	  to	  chicken	  out.	  She	  has	  very	  good	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  past	  nine	  years	  of	  her	  life	  have	  been	  funded	  by	  the	  fruits	  of	  two	  successful	  time	  travel	  journeys.	  It	  occurs	  to	  her	  that	  she	  could,	  with	  confidence,	  go	  jump	  off	   a	   cliff	   right	  now,	   secure	   in	   the	  very	   reasonable	  belief	   that,	  whatever	  else	  happened	   as	   a	   result	   thereof,	   she	   would	   eventually	   be	   fine	   enough	   to	   make	   her	  journeys,	  invest	  her	  money,	  and	  write	  a	  letter	  to	  herself	  explaining	  how	  it	  is	  all	  to	  be	  done.	  But,	  being	  in	  a	  more	  metaphysical	  frame	  of	  mind,	  she	  reflects	  instead	  on	  some	  questions	  about	  freedom.	  	  Let	  us	  suppose	  that	  she	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  time	  traveler	  in	  1979	  and	  2005.	  	  So,	  in	  other	  words,	  let	  us	  suspend	  the	  skeptical	  hypothesis	  that	  says	  she	  is	  a	  victim	  of	  an	  elaborate	  hoax.	  These,	  then,	  are	  her	  two	  questions:	  (Q1)	   Is	  Clare	  now,	  in	  2014,	  free	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  act	  of	  stepping	  into	  the	  time	  machine?	  (Q2)	   Is	  there	  any	  act	  φ	  such	  that	  (a)	  Clare	  performed	  φ	  as	  a	  time	  traveler	  in	  1979	  or	  2005	  and	  (b)	  Clare	  performed	  φ	  freely?	  These	   are	   also	   the	   questions	   on	  which	   the	   present	   paper	   shall	   focus.	   In	   section	   2	  below,	  I	  will	  consider	  Q1	  and	  Q2	  in	  some	  detail	  and,	  with	  Clare,	  I	  will	  answer	  both	  questions	  negatively.	  	  In	  section	  3,	  I	  will	  draw	  some	  more	  general	  conclusions	  about	  the	   relationship	   between	   time	   travel	   and	   freedom,	   arguing	   for	   the	   surprising	  conclusion	   that	   time	   travel	   undermines	   not	   only	   Clare’s	   freedom	   between	   her	  earliest	   arrival	   point	   and	   her	   latest	   departure	   point,	   but	   also	   the	   freedom	   of	  everyone	  else	  who	  exists	  at	  those	  times.	  	  There	  are	  other	  discussions	  of	  the	  tensions	  between	  time	  travel	  and	  freedom	  in	  the	  literature.	  By	  far	  the	  majority	  position	  is	  that	  the	  tensions	  are	  only	  apparent.	  Time	  travelers	  are	  free.	  The	  fact	  that	  time	  travelers	  would	  fail	  en	  masse	  were	  a	  great	  many	   of	   them	   to	   undertake	   paradoxical	   missions	   to	   assassinate	   their	   own	  grandfathers	  or	   to	   commit	   autoinfanticide	   shows	  only	   that	   time	   travel	   is	  weird	   in	  various	   ways,	   not	   that	   it	   is	   impossible	   or	   freedom-­‐undermining. 2 	  The	   most	  important	   recent	   attempt	   to	   defend	   the	   idea	   that	   there	   are	   limitations	   on	   the	  freedom	  of	   time	  travelers	   is	  Kadri	  Vihvelin's	  (1996)	  “What	  Time	  Travelers	  Cannot	  Do.”3	  	  But	  even	  she	  allows	  that	  time	  travelers	  have	  quite	  a	  bit	  of	  freedom	  throughout	  the	   course	   of	   their	   time	   travel	   journeys.	   By	   contrast,	   I	   shall	   argue	   that	   they	   have	  none.	   	  Moreover,	   the	   salient	   issues	   raised	  by	  her	  paper	   are	   substantially	  different	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  See,	  e.g.,	  Lewis	  1976;	  Sider	  1997;	  Sider	  2002;	  Goddu	  2007;	  Carroll	  2010;	  Vranas	  2010;	  and	  Spencer	  2013.	  	  3	  Most	  of	  the	  papers	  cited	  in	  note	  2	  try	  in	  some	  way	  to	  respond	  to	  Vihvelin’s	  argument.	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from	  those	  raised	  in	  the	  present	  one.	  	  Since	  her	  paper	  has	  done	  more	  than	  any	  other	  to	  set	   the	  course	  of	   recent	  discussion	  on	   time	   travel	  and	   freedom,	   I	  will	   close	   this	  introductory	  section	  by	  highlighting	  some	  of	  those	  differences.	  Vihvelin,	   in	   keeping	   with	   trends	   in	   the	   earlier	   literature	   on	   time	   travel,	  focuses	   narrowly	   on	   the	   question	  whether	   time	   travelers	   are	   free	  with	   respect	   to	  specific,	  paradoxical	  acts	  like	  autoinfanticide.	  She	  thinks	  that	  time	  travelers	  cannot	  (as	  opposed	  to	  will	  not)	  perform	  such	  acts.	  But,	  in	  contrast	  to	  what	  I	  shall	  argue,	  she	  insists	   that	   they	   are	   able	   to	   do	   other	   things	   that	   they	   do	   not	   in	   fact	   do	   on	   their	  journeys,	  and	  that	  people	  contemporaneous	  with	  them	  are	  able	  to	  perform	  the	  very	  killings	   and	   such	   that	   they	   cannot	   themselves	  perform.4	  Her	  main	  argument	   turns	  on	   the	   thesis	   that	   a	   time	   traveler	   can	   perform	   a	   particular	   act	   only	   if	   she	  would	  
succeed	  were	   she	   to	  attempt	   it.	  The	  Stalnaker-­‐Lewis	   semantics	   for	   counterfactuals	  then	   takes	   center	   stage	   in	   her	   paper	   as	   she	   argues	   that,	   given	   the	   semantics,	   it	   is	  false	  of	  every	  time	  traveler	  that	  she	  would	  succeed	  were	  she	  to	  attempt	  something	  like	  autoinfanticide,	  but	   it	   is	  perhaps	  not	  false	  that	  she	  would	  succeed	  were	  she	  to	  attempt	   to	   perform	   some	   other	   act	   that	   she	   does	   not	   in	   fact	   perform	   as	   a	   time	  traveler.	   	  The	  arguments	  of	  the	  present	  paper,	  by	  contrast,	  rely	  on	  no	  theses	  about	  the	   correct	   semantics	   for	   counterfactuals.	   Nor	   do	   they	   rely	   on	   theses	   about	   the	  semantics	   for	   ‘can’	   claims,	  which	   feature	   centrally	   in	   Lewis’s	   (1976)	  discussion	  of	  what	   time	   travelers	   can	   and	   cannot	  do,	   as	  well	   as	   in	   several	   of	   the	  discussions	  of	  Vihvelin’s	   paper.	   These	   differences	   are	   important	   in	   no	   small	   part	   because	   the	  semantics	   for	   counterfactuals	   and	   the	   semantics	   for	   ‘can’	   claims	   are	   highly	  controversial.	   The	   assumptions	   driving	   the	   arguments	   of	   the	   present	   paper,	  although	   not	   universally	   accepted,	   are	   significantly	   less	   controversial	   than	   those	  that	  have	  animated	  the	  literature	  on	  Vihvelin’s	  paper.	  	  Moreover,	   and	  most	   importantly,	   neither	   Vihvelin’s	   paper	   nor	  most	   of	   the	  literature	  that	  interacts	  with	  it	  explores	  in	  significant	  detail	  the	  larger	  questions	  that	  most	   centrally	   concern	   Clare—namely,	   questions	   about	   whether	   the	   time	   travel	  journey	  itself	  can	  be	  undertaken	  freely,	  whether	  any	  of	  her	  acts	  at	  all	  on	  the	  journey	  can	   be	   free,	   and	   what	   the	   implications	   of	   her	   journey	   for	   the	   freedom	   of	   others	  might	   be.	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   these	   latter	   sorts	   of	   questions	   have	   been	   addressed,	  they	  have	  typically	  been	  raised	  only	  obliquely	  or	  in	  passing,	  verdicts	  have	  commonly	  been	  announced	  without	  much	  by	  way	  of	  discussion	  or	   argument,	   and	   the	   typical	  verdict	  has	  been	  contrary	  to	  the	  one	  I	  shall	  reach	  in	  this	  paper.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  She	  imagines	  an	  objector	  asking,	  “But	   if	  your	  argument	  works,	  doesn't	   it	  show	  that	  time-­‐travelers	  are	  able	  to	  do	  -­‐	  can	  do	  -­‐	  only	  what	  they	  in	  fact	  do?”;	  then	  she	  answers:	  No.	  There	   are	   other	   things	   time	   travelers	   cannot	  do;	   for	   instance,	   they	   cannot	   kill	  their	  ancestors	  before	  they	  pass	  on	  their	  genes.	  But	  they	  are	  able	  to	  do	  lots	  of	  other	  things;	   they	   have	   plenty	   of	   abilities	   which	   they	   do	   not	   exercise,	   but	   could	   have	  exercised.	  (1996:	  328)	  5	  Slater	   2005	   is	   a	   notable	   exception	   to	   this	   genreral	   rule.	   Slater	   is	   primarily	   concerned	   with	   the	  question	   whether	   the	   time	   travel	   journey	   itself	   might	   be	   free,	   but	   he	   also	   considers	   the	   question	  whether	   the	  acts	  undertaken	  by	  a	   time	   traveler	  on	  her	   journey	  might	  be	   free.	   	  His	  answer	   to	  both	  questions	  is	  that	  the	  acts	  in	  question	  are	  not	  free,	  unless	  we	  are	  willing	  to	  accept	  ontic	  indeterminacy.	  In	  contrast	  to	  Slater,	  I	  do	  not	  offer	  commitment	  to	  ontic	  determinacy	  as	  a	  way	  of	  preserving	  the	  view	  that	   time	   travel	   journeys	   or	   the	   actions	   of	   time	   travelers	   are	   free.	  Kristie	   Lynn	  Miller	   (2009:	   141)	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2.	  Let	  us	  now	  begin	  to	  examine	  Clare’s	  two	  questions.	   	   In	  what	  follows,	   I	  shall	  assume	  the	  truth	  of	  eternalism,	  the	  thesis	  that	  it	  always	  has	  been	  and	  always	  will	  be	  the	  case	  that	  everything	  that	  ever	  did	  exist	  or	  will	  exist	  does	  exist.	  	  This	  assumption	  is	  optional;	  it	  affects	  the	  framing	  of	  my	  argument,	  but	  not	  its	  substance.6	  I	  will	  also	  assume	   that	   freedom	   is	   incompatible	   with	   determinism.	   This	   assumption	   is	   not	  optional.	   If	   freedom	   is	   compatible	   with	   determinism,	   then	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   to	  doubt	  that	  it	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  factors	  that	  I	  take	  to	  undermine	  the	  freedom	  of	  time	  travelers	  and	  of	  agents	  existing	  between	  the	  arrival	  and	  departure	  points	  of	  a	  time	   travel	   journey.	   Thus,	   I	   take	   it	   that	   considerations	   that	   lend	   support	   to	  compatibilism	  will,	  as	  a	  general	  rule,	  also	  count	  against	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  premises	  of	  my	  arguments.	  Let	  t1	  be	  the	  moment	  at	  which	  Clare	  steps	  into	  her	  time	  machine.	  	  Let	  us	  say	  that	  the	  transition	  time	  for	  an	  act	  A	  is	  the	  latest	  time	  at	  which	  A	  is	  up	  to,	  or	  within	  the	  control	  of,	  the	  agent	  who	  performs	  A.7	  Let	  t0	  be	  an	  arbitrary	  plausible	  candidate	  for	  the	   transition	   time	   for	   Clare’s	   act	   of	   stepping	   into	   the	   time	   machine.	   This	   will	  presumably	  be	  a	  time	  very	  close	  to	  t1.	  Now	  consider	  Clare’s	  past	  at	  t0.	  What	  does	  her	  past	  include?	  For	  ordinary	  purposes,	  the	  past	   includes	  all	  and	  only	  events	  that	  are	  earlier	  than	  the	  present	  moment.8	  But	  this	  characterization	  will	  not	  do	  for	  a	  time	  traveler	  who,	  for	  example,	  travels	  to	  a	  time	  earlier	  in	  her	  life	  so	  that	  she	  can	  observe	  or	  affect	  
her	  past.	   	  (If	  her	  past	  includes	  only	  events	  earlier	  than	  what	  is,	  for	  her,	  the	  present	  moment,	   she	   will	   always	   find	   herself	   temporally	   ahead	   of	   her	   past	   rather	   than	  somehow	  present	   in	   it.)	   And	   yet	   if	   the	   concept	   of	   time	   travel	   is	   coherent	   at	   all,	   it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  considers	   the	  question	  whether	   time	   travel	  undermines	   the	   freedom	  of	  others	  and	  answers	   that	   it	  does	  not.	  In	  contrast	  to	  Miller,	  I	  say	  that	  time	  travel	  does	  undermine	  the	  freedom	  of	  others.	  	  6	  One	  might	   be	   tempted	   to	   think	   otherwise.	   Suppose	   Clare	   steps	   into	   the	   time	  machine	   at	   t1.	   Now	  consider	   Clare	   at	   some	   earlier	   time,	   t0	  as	   she	   deliberates	   whether	   to	   step	   into	   the	   time	   machine.	  	  Eternalism	  says	  that	  it	  is	  true	  at	  t0	  that	  the	  event	  of	  Clare’s	  stepping	  into	  the	  time	  machine	  exists.	  But,	  one	  might	   think,	   if	   that	   is	   true	  then	  Clare	  cannot	  refrain	   from	  stepping	   into	   the	   time	  machine	  at	  t1.	  	  How	   could	   she?	   	   The	   event	   “already”	   exists!	   In	   fact,	   however,	   I	   think	   that	   this	   line	   of	   reasoning	   is	  unsound.	  The	  only	  plausible	  arguments	  I	  am	  aware	  of	  for	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  mere	  existence	  of	  future	  acts	  somehow	  implies	  that	  we	  cannot	  refrain	  from	  performing	  them	  are	  fatalistic	  arguments.	  But,	   as	   I	   have	  argued	  elsewhere,	   it	   is	  presentists,	   not	   eternalists,	   that	   face	  problems	   in	   replying	   to	  fatalistic	  arguments.	   (See	  Rea	  2006	  and	  Finch	  and	  Rea	  2008.)	  The	  arguments	  of	   the	  present	  paper	  are	  not	  fatalistic;	  nor	  do	  they	  even	  rely	  on	  the	  sorts	  of	  transfer	  principles	  like	  van	  Inwagen’s	  “Rule	  β”	  (1983:	   94)	   or	   Finch	   and	  Warfield’s	   “Beta	   2”	   principle	   (1998:	   521)	   that	   sometimes	   drive	   fatalistic	  arguments	  7	  The	  terminology	  is	  adapted	  from	  Finch	  2013.	  	  The	  transition	  time	  for	  an	  act	  might	  be,	  but	  need	  not	  be,	  distinct	   from	   the	   time	  at	  which	   the	  act	  occurs.	   If	   (perhaps	  due	   to	  vagueness)	   there	   is	  no	   latest	  time	  at	  which	  a	  particular	   act	   is	  up	   to	   its	   agent,	   the	   transition	   time	  will	   simply	  be	   the	   time	   that	   is	  approached	  as	  a	  limit	  by	  all	  of	  the	  times	  at	  which	  the	  act	  is	  up	  to	  the	  agent.	  	  Strictly	  speaking,	  in	  that	  sort	  of	   case,	   the	   transition	   time	  would	  not	  be	  a	   time	  at	  which	   the	  act	   is	  up	   to	   its	   agent.	  But	   I	   shall	  ignore	  this	  complication	  in	  what	  follows.	  8	  Those	  who	  deny	  that	  there	  is	  a	  privileged	  present	  moment	  (as	  I	  do)	  might	  add	  a	  little	  sophistication	  to	   this	   characterization	  by	   saying,	   furthermore,	   that	   an	   event	   e1	   is	   earlier	   than	   an	   event	  e2	   if,	   and	  only	  if,	  e1	  is	  in	  the	  past	  light	  cone	  of	  e2	  or	  e2	  is	  in	  the	  future	  light	  cone	  of	  e1;	  and	  e1	  is	  later	  than	  e2	  only	  if	  e2	  is	  earlier	  than	  e1.	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seems	  perfectly	  meaningful	  to	  speak	  of	  time	  travelers	  successfully	  traveling	  to	  their	  past	   in	   order	   to	   observe	   or	   causally	   interact	  with	   it.	   	  What,	   then,	   do	  we	  mean	   by	  these	  indexed	  locutions,	  ‘my	  past’,	  ‘her	  past’,	  etc.,	  if	  we	  don’t	  mean	  the	  past	  in	  time?	  To	  answer	  this	  question,	  we	  need	  two	  definitions:	  at	   t,	   e1	   is	   a	   part	   of	   x’s	   causal	   history	   =def	   e1	   stands	   in	   the	   ancestral	   of	   the	  causal	  relation	  to	  an	  event	  e2	  that	  occurs	  at	  t	  and	  involves	  x	  as	  subject.	  
the	  causal	  history	  of	  x	  at	  t	  =def	  the	  sum	  of	  all	  events	  e	  such	  that,	  at	  t,	  e	  is	  a	  part	  of	  x’s	  causal	  history9	  Note	   that	   it	   does	   not	   follow	   from	   these	   definitions	   that	   every	   event	   in	   someone’s	  causal	  history	  has	  exerted	  some	  causal	  influence	  on	  her.	  	  More	  exactly:	  that	  follows	  only	   if	   the	   causal	   relation	   is	   transitive.	   Maybe	   it	   is	   transitive,	   but	   I	   do	   not	   here	  assume	  that	  it	  is.	  As	  I	  see	  it,	  references	  to	  my	  past,	  her	  past,	  and	  so	  on	  are	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  references	  to	  the	  causal	  history	  of	  the	  person	  or	  object	  referred	  to	  by	  the	  relevant	  possessive	  pronoun.10	  	  So,	  for	  example,	  talk	  about	  my	  past	  is	  (typically—especially	  if	  I	  am	  a	  time	  traveler)	  talk	  about	  my	  causal	  history.	   	  To	  say	  that	  an	  event	  lies	  in	  my	  past	  is	  to	  say	  that	  it	  is	  (presently)	  part	  of	  my	  causal	  history.	  	  Similarly	  for	  talk	  about	  
her	  past,	  his	  past,	   etc.	   This	  means,	   of	   course,	   that	   events	   that	   lie	   in	   the	   future	   can	  count	  as	  part	  of	  a	  time	  traveler’s	  past.	  	  Perhaps	  that	  sounds	  surprising,	  but	  I	  submit	  that	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  highly	  intuitive.	  	  It	  is	  surprising	  because	  when	  we	  talk	  about	  our	  past	  we	  normally	  do	  so	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  we	  have	  not	  been	  subject	  to	  backward	  causal	  influences,	  and	  so,	  as	  noted	  above,	  we	  normally	  think	  of	  our	  past	  as	  identical	  to	   the	   past.	   	   But,	   of	   course,	   where	   time	   travel	   is	   concerned,	   the	   assumption	   just	  mentioned	   is	   false.	   	  Once	  we	  see	   this,	   there	   should	  be	  no	  objection	   in	  principle	   to	  speaking	  of	  events	  in	  a	  person’s	  future	  as	  part	  of	  her	  past.	  	  Suppose	  you	  travel	  to	  a	  year	   in	   your	   own	   childhood	  with	   the	   goal	   of	   advising	   your	   younger	   self	   never	   to	  befriend	  the	  person	  who,	   in	  early	  adulthood,	  betrayed	  you	  so	  hurtfully	  as	   to	   leave	  long-­‐lasting	  emotional	  scars.	   	  Even	  as	  you	  arrive,	   it	  makes	  perfect	  sense	  for	  you	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  you	  are	  scarred	  by	  your	  past,	  and	  this	  despite	  the	  fact	  that,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  your	  arrival,	  that	  very	  past	  lies	  in	  the	  future.	  Talk	  of	  our	  past	  is	  usually	  talk	  of	  our	  own	  causal	  history,	  wherever	  that	  may	  lie	  in	  time.11	  The	   contents	   of	   Clare’s	   past	   at	   t0,	   then,	   are	   just	   the	   contents	   of	   her	   causal	  history	   at	   that	   time.	   Let’s	   label	   it	   ‘CH0’.	   What	   does	   CH0	   include?	   Perhaps	   not	  
everything	   that	   has	  happened	   in	   the	  world	  up	  until	   t0,	   for	   perhaps	  not	   everything	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  I	  assume	  that	  for	  any	  two	  events	  there	  is	  a	  distinct	  event	  which	  is	  their	  sum.	  	  My	  argument	  does	  not	  depend	  on	   this	   assumption,	   but	   rejecting	   it	  would	  obviously	   force	  me	   to	   redefine	   the	   term	   ‘causal	  history’	  and	  would	  perhaps	  affect	  the	  formulation	  of	  several	  other	  claims	  herein	  as	  well.	  10	  Compare	  Lewis	  (1976)	  on	  the	  distinction	  between	  external	  time	  and	  personal	  time.	  The	  distinction	  I	  wish	  to	  draw—between	  the	  past	  (in	  time)	  and	  a	  person’s	  causal	  history	  is	  similar,	  but	  not	  identical.	  11	  Compare	  Vihvelin,	   commenting	  on	   time-­‐traveling	   Suzy’s	   attempt	   to	   kill	   her	  baby	   self:	   	   “The	  way	  Suzy	  and	  her	  surroundings	  are	  now	  is	  caused	  not	  only	  by	  the	  past	  but	  also	  by	  the	  future-­‐tensed	  fact	  that	  Baby	  Suzy	  will	  survive	  to	  be	  the	  adult	  Suzy.”	  (1996:	  12)	  I	  think	  that	  the	  basic	  idea	  here	  is	  correct.	  My	  differences	  with	  Vihvelin	  on	  this	  point	  concern	  the	  relata	  of	  the	  causal	  relation	  (she	  places	  future-­‐
tensed	  facts	   among	   the	  relata,	  whereas	   I	  do	  not),	  and	   the	  generality	  of	   the	   theses	  we	  are	  willing	   to	  affirm	  about	  what	  future	  events	  might	  lie	  in	  an	  agent’s	  causal	  history	  at	  a	  time.	  These	  differences,	  I	  think—especially	  the	  latter—go	  some	  distance	  toward	  explaining	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  conclusions	  we	  reach.	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earlier	   than	   t0	   stands	   in	   the	   ancestral	   of	   the	   causal	   relation	   to	   an	   event	   involving	  Clare	   at	   t0.	   But	   quite	   a	   lot	   of	   what	   has	   happened	   up	   until	   t0	   will	   belong	   to	   CH0,	  including	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  what	  happened	  to	  Clare	  qua	  time	  traveler	  during	  the	  course	  of	  her	  time	  travel	  journey.	  	  For	  example,	  Clare	  owns	  a	  time	  machine	  at	  t0;	  and,	  as	  is	  evident	   from	   the	   story	   of	   Clare’s	   life,	  many	   of	   the	   things	   that	   Clare	   did	   as	   a	   time	  traveler—investing	   in	  Eaton	  Vance	  stock,	   for	  example,	  and	  setting	  up	   the	  offshore	  account—belong	   to	   a	   chain	   of	   causal	   relations	   leading	   up	   to	   the	   completion	   of	  Clare’s	  time	  machine.	  All	  of	  these	  actions,	  then,	  as	  well	  as	  many	  of	  the	  environmental	  factors	   that	   influenced	   those	   actions,	   must	   be	   part	   of	   her	   causal	   history	   at	   t0.	  	  Moreover,	   since	   her	   actions	   qua	   time	   traveler	   are	   causally	   dependent	   upon	   	  her	  stepping	  into	  the	  time	  machine	  at	  t1,	   it	   follows	  that	  Clare’s	  causal	  history	  at	  t0	  also	  includes	  her	  act	  of	   stepping	   into	   the	   time	  machine	  at	   t1.	  This	   last	   claim—that	  CH0	  includes	  Clare’s	  act	  of	  stepping	  into	  the	  time	  machine	  at	  t1—is	  the	  first	  premise	  of	  the	  main	   argument.	   Given	  my	   earlier	   stipulations	   regarding	   the	   use	   of	   terms	   like	  ‘Clare’s	  past’,	   this	  premise	   is	  equivalent	   to	   the	   thesis	   that	  Clare’s	  stepping	   into	   the	  time	  machine	  lies	  in	  her	  past.	  	  	  The	  second	  premise,	  informally	  put,	  is	  that	  no	  one	  able	  to	  do	  anything	  that	  is	  precluded	  by	  her	  own	  causal	  history.	  Somewhat	  more	  formally,	  no	  one	  is	  able,	  at	  a	  time	   later	   than	   t,	  to	  perform	  an	  act	  of	   either	  of	   the	   following	   types:	   (a)	   refraining	  from	  an	  act	  that	   is	  already	  part	  of	  her	  causal	  history	  at	  t,	  or	  (b)	  performing	  an	  act	  such	  that,	   for	  some	  event	  e	  in	  her	  causal	  history,	  necessarily,	  she	  performs	  the	  act	  only	   if	   e	   is	  not	   in	   her	   causal	   history.	   Still	  more	   formally:	   Let	   ‘CHSt’	  abbreviate	   ‘S’s	  causal	   history	   at	   t,’	   and	   let	   t	   be	   an	   arbitrary	   candidate	   transition	   time	   for	   some	  particular	  act	  φ	  of	  which	  S	  is	  the	  agent	  at	  t*.	  Then	  (a)	  S	  is	  able	  at	  t	  to	  refrain	  from	  φ-­‐ing	  at	  t*	  only	  if	  S’s	  φ-­‐ing	  at	  t*	  is	  not	  part	  of	  CHSt,	  and	  (b)	  S	  is	  able	  at	  t	  to	  φ	  at	  t*	  only	  if	  there	  is	  no	  event	  e	  in	  CHSt	  such	  that,	  necessarily,	  S	  φ’s	  at	  t	  only	  if	  e	  is	  not	  in	  CHSt.	  	  This	   second	   premise	   embodies	   a	   perfectly	   standard	   incompatibilist	  understanding	  of	  ability.	   Incompatibilists	  maintain	  that	  an	  agent	   is	  able	   to	  do	  only	  that	  which	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  laws	  of	  nature	  and	  the	  hard	  or	  fixed	  facts	  about	  the	  past.	  	  It	  is	  notoriously	  difficult	  to	  say	  what	  exactly	  it	  is	  for	  an	  event	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  fixed	  past;	  but	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  general	  agreement	  that,	  at	  any	  given	  time,	  the	  fixed	  past	   includes	  every	  event	  whose	  effects	   lie	   in	  the	  past	  or	  the	  present.12	  If	  an	  event	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  I	  do	  not	  take	  this	  general	  agreement	  to	  be	  explicitly	  acknowledged	  in	  the	  literature.	  	  But	  it	  is	  implied	  by	  what	  many	  philosophers	  tend	  to	  say	  about	  (e.g.)	  the	  fixity	  of	  the	  past,	  accidental	  necessity,	  and	  the	  distinction	  between	  hard	   facts	   and	   soft	   facts.	  Consider,	   for	   example,	  Alvin	  Plantinga’s	   (1986)	  well-­‐known	  characterization	  of	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  a	  proposition	  is	  accidentally	  necessary:	  (42)	  	  p	  is	  accidentally	  necessary	  at	  t	  if	  and	  only	  if	  p	  is	  true	  at	  t	  and	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  both	  that	  p	  is	  true	  at	  t	  and	  that	  there	  exist	  agents	  S1…,Sn	  and	  actions	  A1…An	  and	  such	  that	  (1)	  Ai	   is	  basic	   for	  Si,	   (2)	  Si	  has	  the	  power	  at	  t	  or	   later	  to	  perform	  Ai,	  and	  (3)	  necessarily	  if	  Si	  were	  to	  perform	  Ai	  at	  t	  or	  later,	  then	  p	  would	  have	  been	  false.	  	  Let	   t	   be	   an	   arbitrary	   moment	   in	   2013	   before	   Clare	   steps	   into	   the	   time	   machine;	   let	   p	   be	   the	  proposition	  that	  e	  occurred,	  for	  some	  arbitrary	  e	  in	  Clare’s	  causal	  history	  (past	  or	  future)	  that	  is	  not	  a	  basic	  action	  for	  Clare.	  It	  seems	  obvious	  that	  there	  is	  no	  basic	  action	  that	  Clare	  (or	  others)	  can	  perform	  later	  than	  t	  whose	  performance	  entails	  (e.g.)	  that	  Clare	  does	  not	  step	  into	  the	  time	  machine	  at	  t1	  or	  	  	  that	  Clare	  did	  not	  mail	  a	  package	  to	  herself	  in	  2005.	  	  (Suppose,	  for	  example,	  that	  stepping	  forward	  is	  one	  sort	  of	  basic	  act	  and	  stepping	  backward	  is	  another.	  	  Suppose	  further	  that,	  at	  the	  crucial	  moment,	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has	   left	   its	  mark	  on	   the	  world,	   it	   is	  part	  of	   the	   fixed	  past.	  But	  events	   in	  an	  agent’s	  own	   causal	  history	  have	   left	   their	  mark—perhaps	  not	  on	   the	   agent	  herself,	   but	   at	  least	  on	  something	  which	  has	  left	  its	  mark	  on	  something	  which	  has	  left	  its	  mark	  on	  something…which	   has	   left	   its	   mark	   on	   the	   agent.	   Thus,	   given	   standard	  incompatibilist	   assumptions,	   one	   is	   not	   able	   to	   do	   anything	   that	   is	   logically	  incompatible	  with	  the	  occurrence	  of	  one	  of	  those	  events.	  One	  can	  give	  up	  this	  notion	  of	  ability	  by	  denying	  that	  the	  fixed	  past	  imposes	  constraints	  on	  what	  an	  agent	  is	  able	  to	  do.	  But	   if	  one	   is	  willing	   to	   take	   this	  route,	   I	  cannot	  see	  what	   further	  motivation	  one	  might	  have	  for	  endorsing	  incompatibilism.	  Obviously	  enough,	  if	  time	  travel	  is	  possible	  then	  what	  I	  have	  just	  said	  implies	  that	   future	   events	   may	   be	   part	   of	   one’s	   fixed	   past.	   This	   is	   somewhat	  counterintuitive.	   But	   that	   is	   not	   my	   problem;	   it	   is	   just	   one	   of	   the	   many	  counterintuitive	   features	   of	   the	   supposition	   that	   time	   travel	   is	   possible.	   A	   world	  with	  time	  travel	  is	  strange	  in	  many	  ways,	  and	  this	  is	  one	  of	  them.	  	  I	  note	  in	  passing	  that	   a	   further	   implication	   is	   that	   one	   should	   not	   characterize	   soft	   facts	   (or	   the	  
unfixed	  past)	  as	  consisting	   in	   those	   facts	   that	   in	  some	  way	  depend	  on	  the	   future.13	  Once	   time	   travel	   enters	   the	   picture,	   this	   characterization	   immediately	   yields	   the	  result	  that	  facts	  about	  an	  agent’s	  own	  causal	  history—facts	  about	  whose	  obtaining	  neither	  she	  nor	  any	  other	  presently	  existing	  agent	  has	  any	  choice	  whatsoever—are	  soft.	  	  But,	  as	  I	  have	  just	  explained,	  this	  is	  an	  unwanted	  result.	  	  From	  here,	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  argument	  is	  straightforward.	  	  For	  completeness,	  I	  repeat	   (using	   somewhat	   different	  wording)	   the	   first	   two	   premises	   along	  with	   the	  remainder.	   Let	   AC	   be	   the	   act	   of	   stepping	   into	   the	   time	   machine,	   which	   Clare	  performs	  at	  t1;	   let	  t0	  be	  a	  candidate	  transition	  time	  for	  AC;	   let	   ‘CHSt’	  abbreviate	   ‘S’s	  causal	  history	  at	  t’;	  and	  let	  CH0	  be	  Clare’s	  causal	  history	  at	  t0.	  	  (MA1)	  Clare’s	  performing	  AC	  at	  t1	  is	  part	  of	  CH0.	  (Premise)	  (MA2)	  Let	   t	   be	   an	   arbitrary	   candidate	   transition	   time	   for	   some	  particular	  act	  φ	  of	  which	  S	  is	  the	  agent	  at	  t*.	  Then	  (a)	  S	  is	  able	  at	  t	  to	  refrain	  from	  φ-­‐ing	  at	  t*	  only	  if	  S’s	  φ-­‐ing	  at	  t*	  is	  not	  part	  of	  CHSt,	  and	  (b)	  S	  is	  able	  at	  t	  to	  φ	  at	  t*	  only	  if	  there	  is	  no	  event	  e	  in	  CHSt	  such	  that,	  necessarily,	  S	  φ’s	  at	  t	  only	  if	  e	  is	  not	   in	  CHSt.	  (Premise)	  (MA3)	  Clare	   is	   able	   at	   t0	   to	   refrain	   from	   performing	   AC	   at	   t1	   only	   if	  Clare’s	  performing	  AC	  at	  t1	  is	  not	  part	  of	  CH0.	  	  (From	  MA2)	  	  (MA4)	  Therefore:	  Clare	  is	  not	  able	  at	  t0	  to	  refrain	  from	  performing	  AC	  at	  t1.	  (From	  MA1,	  MA3)	  (MA5)	  Necessarily,	  S	  performs	  A	  freely	  at	  t	  only	  if	  at	  some	  time	  t0	  [t0	  ≤	  
t],	   S	   is	   (i)	   able	   to	  perform	  A	   at	   t	   and	   (ii)	   able	   to	   refrain	   from	  performing	  A	  at	  t.	  (Premise)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Clare	  steps	  into	  the	  time	  machine	  by	  stepping	  forward.	  	  Still,	  there	  are	  worlds	  wherein	  she	  steps	  into	  the	  time	  machine	  by	  performing	  a	  different	  basic	  act—e.g.,	  stepping	  backward.	  Etc.)	  	  Thus	  (3)	  is	  false.	  But	   if	   (3)	   is	   false,	   it	   is	   necessarily	   false;	   hence	   the	   bi-­‐conditional	   is	   true;	   hence,	   p	   is	   accidentally	  necessary.	   	  For	  a	  small	  sampling	  of	  other	  characterizations	  of	  accidental	  necessity,	  cf.	  Fischer	  2011	  and	  Flint	  2012.	  13	  Cf.,	  e.g.,	  Fischer	  1983;	  Fischer	  2011,	  and	  especially	  Todd	  2013.	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  (MA6)	  Therefore;	  It	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  Clare	  performs	  AC	  freely	  at	  t1.	  (From	  MA4,	  MA5)	  MA1	   is	   merely	   stipulative,	   and	   MA5	   is	   an	   entirely	   natural	   assumption	   given	  incompatibilism.14	  I	  have	  already	  spoken	  on	  behalf	  of	  MA2	  as	  well.	  MA3,	  MA4	  and	  MA6	   are	   valid	   consequences	   of	   the	   premises	   cited	   in	   support	   of	   each.	   	   So	   the	  conclusion	  follows:	  Clare	  does	  not	  step	  into	  the	  time	  machine	  freely.	  Q1	  is	  thus	  to	  be	  answered	  negatively.	  	   Let	  us	  turn	  now	  to	  Q2:	  Is	  there	  any	  act	  A	  such	  that	  (a)	  Clare	  performed	  A	  as	  a	  time	   traveler	   in	  1979	  or	  2005	  and	   (b)	  Clare	  performed	  A	   freely?	   	  Consider	   t2,	  	   the	  earliest	  time	  at	  which	  Clare	  exists	  as	  a	  time	  traveler	  in	  1979.	  	  I	  take	  it	  as	  obvious	  that	  Clare’s	   causal	   history	   at	   t1—again,	   the	   moment	   she	   enters	   the	   time	   machine—includes	   all	   of	   the	   same	   events	   as	   does	   her	   causal	   history	   at	   t0,	   plus	   a	   few	  more.	  What	  about	  her	  causal	  history	  at	  t2?	   	  Does	  Clare’s	  causal	  history	  at	  t2	   include	  all	  of	  the	  same	  events	  that	  it	  included	  at	  t0?	  	  Of	  course	  it	  does;	  for	  it	  is	  obviously	  true	  that	  all	  of	  the	  same	  events	  in	  CH0	  (plus	  some	  additional	  ones)	  belong	  to	  a	  chain	  of	  causal	  relations	   leading	   up	   to	   an	   event	   involving	   Clare	   at	   t2.	   Clare’s	   body	   is	   still,	   upon	  arrival	   in	  1979,	   the	  product	   of	   the	   same	  processes	  of	   biological	   development	   that	  shaped	  it	  in	  the	  years	  leading	  up	  to	  t1;	  Clare’s	  psyche	  still	  bears	  the	  marks	  of	  the	  joys	  and	  trials	  of	  her	  childhood,	  adolescence,	  and	  early	  adulthood;	  Clare	  still	  has	  genuine,	  causally	   produced	   memories	   of	   her	   life	   leading	   up	   to	   t1,	   including	   (of	   course)	  memories	  of	  her	   intentions	   for	  her	   time	   travel	   journey.	   	  And	   so	  on.	   	  But	   if	   Clare’s	  causal	   history	   at	   t2	  does	   include	   all	   of	   the	   same	   events	   that	   comprise	   her	   causal	  history	   at	   t1,	   then	  her	   causal	   history	   at	   t2	   includes	  everything	  that	  she	  will	  do	  as	  a	  
time	  traveler	  in	  1979.	  	  So,	  for	  any	  act	  φ	  that	  she	  performs	  as	  a	  time	  traveler	  in	  1979,	  we	  can	   just	   reiterate	   the	  main	  argument,	   substituting	  a	  name	   for	  φ	   in	  place	  of	  AC,	  and	  replacing	  ‘t0’	  with	  ‘t2’	  and	  ‘t1’	  with	  the	  time	  when	  φ	  is	  performed.	  This	  will	  give	  us	   an	   argument	   for	   the	   conclusion	   that	   Clare	   does	   not	   perform	  φ	   freely.	   	   And,	   of	  course,	  the	  same	  goes	  for	  her	  acts	  in	  2005.	  	  Q2	  is	  thus	  to	  be	  answered	  negatively	  as	  well.	  	  	  
	  
3.	  	   In	  light	  of	  the	  foregoing,	  it	  is	  tempting	  to	  conclude	  that,	  between	  the	  earliest	  arrival	   point	   of	   Clare’s	   journeys	   as	   a	   time	   traveler	   and	   the	   latest	   departure	  point,	  Clare	  does	  not	  act	  freely.	  	  But	  we	  are	  not	  yet	  entitled	  to	  this	  conclusion.	  For	  during	  some	  of	   the	   time	  between	  1979	   and	  2014	   (namely,	   those	   times	  when	  Clare	   is	   bi-­‐located),	   Clare	   not	   only	   acts	   qua	   time	   traveler	  but	   also	   as	   an	   ordinary,	   non-­‐time-­‐traveler.	  	  	  I	  have	  shown	  that	  nothing	  she	  does	  as	  a	  time	  traveler	  in	  1979	  or	  2005	  is	  free.	  	  But	  I	  have	  not	  yet	  shown	  that	  nothing	  she	  does,	  period,	  in	  1979	  or	  2005	  is	  free.	  	   Indeed,	  we	  might	  doubt	   that	   this	   can	  be	   shown.	   	   I	   have	   said	   that	   I	  wish	   to	  remain	  neutral	   on	   the	  question	  whether	  objects	  persist	  by	  having	   temporal	  parts.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  For	  discussion,	  see	  Finch	  2013.	  One	  might	  dispense	  with	  MA5	  and	  replace	  all	  of	  the	  ability	  claims	  in	   the	   other	   premises	   of	   the	   argument	   with	   claims	   about	   freedom—so	   that,	   e.g.,	   ‘S	   is	   able	   at	   t	   to	  refrain	  from	  φ-­‐ing	  at	  t*’	  would	  become	  ‘S	  is	  at	  t	  free	  with	  respect	  to	  whether	  S	  φs	  at	  t*’—and	  make	  appropriate	   other	   adjustments	   as	   needed.	   Doing	   so	   would,	   I	   think,	   make	   the	   premises	   of	   the	  argument	  somewhat	  less	  immediately	  intuitive;	  but,	  ultimately,	  I	  think	  that	  they	  would	  be	  no	  more	  or	  less	  defensible.	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But	   let	  us	  drop	  neutrality	   for	  a	  moment	  and	  affirm	  the	  doctrine	  of	   temporal	  parts.	  Do	  we	  not	  find	  a	  relevant	  difference	  between	  Clare’s	  time-­‐traveling	  temporal	  parts	  and	   her	   non-­‐time-­‐traveling	   temporal	   parts?	   The	   time-­‐traveling	   parts	   are	   causally	  downstream	   from	   the	   time-­‐travel	   journey.	   Up	   until	   she	   receives	   the	   note	   from	  herself	  in	  2005,	  however,	  matters	  are	  less	  clear	  for	  the	  non-­‐time-­‐traveling	  temporal	  parts.	   Thus,	   it	   is	   unclear	   that	   the	  main	   argument	   can	   be	   used	   to	   show	   that	   Clare,	  insofar	  as	  she	  acts	  as	  a	  non-­‐time-­‐traveler	  after	  t2	  in	  1979,	  acts	  unfreely.	  	   The	  question	  turns	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  causal	  history	  of	  Clare’s	  earliest	  time-­‐traveling	  stage15	  (call	  that	  stage	  ‘AC1’—‘AC’	  for	  ‘Adult	  Clare’,	  of	  course)	  and	   the	   causal	   history	   of	   the	   younger	   stage	   that	   exists	   simultaneously	  with	  Adult	  Clare	  (call	   that	  one	   ‘BC1’—‘BC’	   for	   ‘Baby	  Clare’).	   	  AC1’s	  causal	  history	   includes	  the	  causal	  history	  of	  BC1,	  obviously.	  But	  so	   long	  as	  the	  causal	  histories	  do	  not	  overlap	  on	  events	   that	  occur	   at	   t2	  or	   afterward,	   the	   supposition	   that	  Clare	   acts	   freely	   as	   a	  non-­‐time-­‐traveler	   throughout	   1979	   seems	   unproblematic.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   if	  their	   causal	   histories	  do	  overlap	  on	   events	   that	   occur	   at	   t2	  or	   afterward	   (or	   if	   the	  same	   is	   true	   for	   a	   pair	   of	   later	   Clare-­‐stages	   that	   exist	   simultaneously	   with	   one	  another	  in	  1979	  or	  2005),	  then	  the	  main	  argument	  does	  generate	  a	  problem.	  	  I	  will	  consider	  first	  the	  question	  of	  overlap,	  and	  then	  I	  will	  show	  just	  how	  the	  problem	  is	  generated.	  	   Suppose,	   first,	   that	   the	   following	   thesis	   is	   and	   always	   has	   been	   true:	  	  Everybody	   shares	   the	   same	  causal	  history	  up	   to	   some	  particular	   time	   in	   the	   fairly	  recent	  past.	  	  This	  is	  obviously	  not	  to	  say	  that	  everyone	  has	  been	  affected	  in	  exactly	  the	  same	  way	  by	  the	  same	  events	  up	  until	  some	  time	  in	  the	  recent	  past.	  	  Rather,	  it	  is	  only	   to	   say	   that	   from	  some	   time	   in	   the	   recent	  past	  on	  backward,	   every	  event	   that	  stands	  in	  the	  ancestral	  of	  the	  causal	  relation	  to	  an	  event	  involving	  me	  also	  stands	  in	  the	   ancestral	   of	   the	   causal	   relation	   to	   events	   involving	   every	   other	   person	   in	   the	  world.	   So,	   for	   example,	   the	   events	   of	   September	   11,	   2001	   (both	   known	   and	  unknown)	   may	   have	   affected	   my	   life	   much	   differently	   from	   however	   they	   have	  affected	  yours.	  Nevertheless,	  those	  same	  events	  belong	  to	  both	  your	  causal	  history	  and	  mine.	  	  More	  formally:	  For	  any	  time	  t	  in	  evolutionary	  history	  on	  earth,	  all	  person-­‐stages	  p	  that	  exist	  at	  t	  belong	  to	  a	  system	  s	  of	  causally	  related	  events	  of	  which	  the	  following	  condition	  holds:	  there	  is	  some	  duration	  d	  such	  that,	  for	  any	  event	  e	  in	  s,	  if	  the	  duration	  between	  e’s	  occurrence	  and	  t	  is	  greater	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  d,	  then	  every	  event	  in	  e’s	  causal	  history	  is	  also	  in	  p’s	  causal	  history.	  	  Call	  this	  thesis	  ‘LOCAL	  HOLISM’.	  I	   find	   LOCAL	  HOLISM	  plausible.	   If	   it	   is	   true,	   and	   if	   the	   relevant	   duration	   d	   is	  reasonably	  short,	  then	  fairly	  soon	  after	  t2,	   there	  will	  be	  a	  time	  t3	  after	  which	  every	  subsequently	   existing	   Clare	   stage	   (Adult,	   Baby,	   and	   anything	   in	   between)	   has	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  I	  will	   use	   the	   term	   ‘stage’	   to	   refer	   simply	   to	   instantaneous	   temporal	   parts	   of	   perduring	   entities,	  without	   intending	   to	  evoke	   the	   rest	  of	  what	   is	  now	  known	  as	   “stage	   theory”	  or	   “exdurantism”.	   (Cf.	  Hawley	   2001)	   The	   following	   discussion	   could	   be	   recast	   under	   exdurantist	   assumptions	   without	  substantial	   modification.	   It	   could	   be	   recast	   under	   the	   assumption	   that	   endurantism	   is	   true	   by	  replacing	  talk	  of	  the	  causal	  histories	  of	  particular	  stages	  with	  region-­‐indexed	  causal	  histories,	  or	  by	  recasting	  the	  discussion	  in	  accord	  with	  whatever	  other	  strategy	  one	  might	  favor	  for	  explaining	  how	  Clare	  could	  have	  different	  intrinsic	  properties	  at	  multiple	  regions	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Endurantists	  who	  cannot	  accommodate	  that	  state	  of	  affairs	  are	  not	  among	  the	  target	  audience	  of	  this	  paper,	  since	  they	  cannot	  accommodate	  time	  travel	  stories	  of	  the	  sort	  envisioned	  here.	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causal	  history	   that	   includes	  all	  of	   the	  events	   in	  AC1’s	  causal	  history.	  The	  reason	   is	  simple:	   Clare’s	   arrival	   in	   1979	   is	   an	   event	   (call	   it	   ‘e1’)	  whose	   causal	   history	   is	  identical	   to	   AC1’s;	   and	   LOCAL	   HOLISM	   implies	   that,	   from	   t3	   onward,	   every	   person	  stage—and	  so	  every	  Clare	  stage—has	  the	  event	  comprising	  e1’s	  causal	  history	  in	  its	  own.	   	   But	   if	   this	   is	   right,	   then	   for	   any	   act	   A	   that	   Clare	   performs	   either	  as	  a	   time-­‐
traveler	  or	  as	  a	  non-­‐time-­‐traveler	  after	  t3,	  substituting	  a	  name	  for	  φ	  in	  place	  of	  AC	  in	  the	  main	  argument	  above	  (and	  making	  the	  necessary	  adjustments	  in	  the	  names	  for	  times)	  will	   yield	   an	   argument	   for	   the	   conclusion	   that	   it	   is	   not	   the	   case	   that	   Clare	  performs	  φ	  freely.	  	  This	  is	  not	  quite	  the	  conclusion	  that	  nothing	  Clare	  does	  between	  
t2	  and	  t1	  is	  free;	  but	  it	  is	  close	  enough.	  Moreover,	  it	  should	  be	  obvious	  that	  we	  now	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  reach	  a	  far	  more	  general	  conclusion.	  	  As	  I	  have	  just	  said,	  from	  t3	  onward,	  every	  person	  stage	  has	  AC1’s	  casual	  history	  as	   its	  own.	  Furthermore,	  by	  LOCAL	  HOLISM	  and	  the	  supposition	  that	   the	   relevant	   duration	   d	   is	   fairly	   short,	   CH0	   (which	   is	   included	   in	   the	   causal	  history	  of	  AC1)	  includes	  every	  event	  in	  the	  causal	  history	  of	  every	  person-­‐stage	  from	  a	  short	  time	  prior	  to	  t0	  on	  backward	  throughout	  past	  time.	  	  From	  this	  it	  follows	  that	  everyone	  existing	  between	  t3	  and	  some	  time	  shortly	  before	  t0	  has	  at	  any	  time	  in	  that	  duration	   a	   causal	   history	   that	   includes	   everything	   that	   he	   or	   she	  will	   do	   between	  those	  times.	   	  Appropriate	  substitutions	   into	  the	  main	  argument	  will	   thus	  yield,	   for	  any	  one	  of	  those	  acts,	  an	  argument	  for	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  act	  is	  not	  performed	  freely.	  	  It	   is	  perhaps	  tempting	  to	  raise	  the	  following	  objection	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  Baby	  Clare	   and	   Adult	   Clare	   can	   ever	   have	   causal	   histories	   that	   overlap	   on	   events	   that	  happen	  later	  in	  (Baby)	  Clare’s	  life:	  	  Adult	  Clare	  has	  experienced	  events	  like	  her	  fifth	  birthday,	  her	  first	  kiss,	  her	  surprise	  at	  receiving	  a	  note	  from	  herself	  in	  2005,	  and	  so	  on;	  Baby	  Clare	  has	  experienced	  none	  of	  these	  things.	  Thus	  they	  have	  been	  subject	  to	  different	   influences;	   thus	   they	   have	   different	   causal	   histories.16	  This	   objection,	  however,	   rests	   on	   an	   understanding	   of	   ‘causal	   history’	   that	   differs	   from	   the	  understanding	   in	   play	   in	   my	   argument.	   	   The	   objection	   has	   force	   only	   under	   the	  assumption	  that	  a	  person’s	  causal	  history	  includes	  only	  events	  that	  have,	  as	  I	  have	  been	  putting	  it,	  “left	  their	  mark”	  directly	  upon	  the	  person	  herself—events	  that	  she	  has	   experienced	   or	   that	   have	   otherwise	   directly	   affected	   her.	   	   It	   has	   no	   force,	  however,	  if	  an	  event	  counts	  as	  part	  of	  a	  person’s	  causal	  history	  just	  in	  case	  the	  event	  stands	   in	   the	   ancestral	   of	   the	   causal	   relation	   to	   some	   event	   involving	   the	   person.	  	  Returning	   to	   an	   earlier	   example,	   the	   events	   of	   September	   11,	   2001	   stand	   in	   my	  causal	  history;	  but	  I	  have	  no	  first	  hand	  experience	  of	  them	  and	  the	  effects	  they	  have	  had	   on	   my	   life	   are	   very	   different	   from	   the	   effects	   they	   have	   had	   on	   the	   lives	   of	  others.	  	  All	  the	  more	  so	  for	  events	  that	  stand	  in	  the	  ancestral	  of	  the	  causal	  relation	  to	  events	  involving	  me	  and	  others	  without	  having	  had	  any	  direct	  effects	  upon	  any	  of	  us	  whatsoever—events	  that	  occurred	  a	  century	  ago,	  for	  example.	  	   Although	  I	  find	  LOCAL	  HOLISM	  plausible,	  I	  have	  no	  argument	  to	  support	  it.	  	  So	  I	  simply	  note	  that	  LOCAL	  HOLISM	  is	  among	  the	  theses	  that	  one	  would	  have	  to	  reject	   if	  one	  wanted	  to	  resist	  my	  argument	   for	  the	  conclusion	  that	  Clare	   is	  unfree	  between	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  I	   owe	   this	   objection	   to	   Kathrin	   Koslicki,	   although	   I	   should	   note	   that	   she	   raised	   the	   objection	   in	  response	  to	  an	  earlier	  version	  of	  this	  paper,	  wherein	  my	  resources	  for	  replying	  were	  far	  less	  clear.	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her	  earliest	  arrival	  point	  and	  her	  latest	  departure	  point.	  	  Perhaps	  you	  will	  agree	  that	  this	  assumption	  is	  not	  to	  be	  rejected.	   	  If	  so,	  then	  you	  are	  already	  committed	  to	  the	  conclusions	  I	  hope	  to	  reach.	   If	  not,	   then	  there	   is	   the	  following	  further	  argument	  to	  consider.	  	   Suppose	   LOCAL	   HOLISM	   is	   false	   and	   consider	   two	   stages	   of	   two	   different	  people,	  p1	   and	  p2—stages	   that	   exist	   at	   the	   same	   time	   but	   at	   some	   great	   distance	  from	  one	  another,	  and	  whose	  causal	  histories	   fail	   to	  overlap	  on	  at	   least	  one	  event.	  	  Let	   CHP1	   be	   the	   causal	   history	   of	   the	   first;	   let	   CHP2	   be	   the	   causal	   history	   of	   the	  second;	  let	  e	  be	  an	  event	  that	  is	  part	  of	  CHP1’s	  but	  not	  part	  of	  CHP2’s.	  	  Now,	  suppose	  that	  e’s	  belonging	  to	  CHP1	   is	   inconsistent	  with	  p2’s	  performing	  a	  certain	  act,	  A	  at	  t.	  That	  is,	  suppose	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  both	  that	  e	  is	  part	  of	  CHP1	  and	  that	  p2	  performs	  A	  at	  t.	  Is	  p2	  able	  to	  perform	  A	  at	  t?	  	   It	   is	  hard	  to	   imagine	  an	   incompatibilist	  giving	  an	  affirmative	  answer	  to	   this	  question.	   	   To	   do	   so	   is	   to	   suppose	   that	   there	   is	   a	   possible	   world	   in	   which	   the	  following	  scenario	  is	  true	  at	  some	  time	  t:	  (SCENARIO)	   There	  is	  an	  object	  x	  and	  event	  e	  such	  that	  (a)	  e	  is	  part	  of	  x’s	  fixed	  past	  at	   t,	   but	   (b)	   someone	  y	   is	   able	  at	   t	  to	  do	   something	  φ	  such	  that,	  necessarily,	  y	  does	  φ	  only	  if	  e	  is	  not	  part	  of	  x’s	  fixed	  past.	  	  Incompatibilists	  should	  regard	  SCENARIO	  as	  impossible.	  For,	  it	  seems	  to	  me,	  everyone	  should	  agree	  that	  if	  no	  one	  is	  able	  do	  anything	  precluded	  by	  her	  own	  fixed	  past,	  then	  likewise	  no	  one	  is	  able	  to	  do	  anything	  precluded	  by	  someone	  (or	  something)	  else’s	  fixed	  past.	  	  	  	   We	   can	   sum	   up	   the	   salient	   content	   of	   the	   previous	   paragraph	   in	   a	   single	  principle:	  (FIXED)	   No	  one	   is	  able	   to	  do	  anything	   that	   is	  precluded	  by	  her	  own	   fixed	  past;	  and,	  for	  any	  x	  and	  y,	  if	  e	  is	  part	  of	  x’s	  fixed	  past	  at	  a	  time	  t,	  it	  is	  part	  of	  y’s	  fixed	  past	  at	  t.	  Incompatibilists,	  as	  I	  have	  just	  argued,	  should	  accept	  FIXED.	  	  But	  if	  FIXED	  is	  true,	  and	  if	  (as	   I	   said	  earlier),	   for	  any	  x,	   x’s	  own	  causal	  history	   is	  part	  of	  x’s	   fixed	  past,	   then	   it	  follows	   that	   AC1’s	   causal	   history	   is	   part	   of	   BC1’s	   fixed	   past.	   	   By	   reapplication	   of	  FIXED,	  it	  follows	  that	  Clare	  is	  not	  able	  to	  refrain	  from	  doing	  anything	  that	  she	  in	  fact	  does	  between	  t2	  in	  1979	  and	  t1	  in	  2014,	  from	  which	  it	  follows	  that	  she	  does	  not	  do	  any	   of	   those	   things	   freely.	   We	   have	   now	   (finally)	   reached	   our	   most	   general	  conclusion	  about	  Clare:	  Clare	  does	  not	   act	   freely	   at	   any	   time	  between	   the	   earliest	  arrival	  point	  and	  the	  latest	  departure	  point	  of	  her	  time	  travel	  journey.	  	   As	  with	   the	   argument	   from	  LOCAL	  HOLISM,	  we	   are	   now	   also	   in	   a	   position	   to	  reach	  an	  even	  more	  general	  conclusion.	  	  Consider	  an	  arbitrary	  time	  t	  later	  than	  t2	  in	  1979.	  	  Clare’s	  causal	  history	  at	  t,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  includes	  all	  of	  the	  events	  in	  AC1’s	  causal	  history;	  thus,	  all	  of	  those	  events	  are	  part	  of	  her	  fixed	  past	  at	  t.	  	  FIXED	  implies	  that	  all	  of	  those	  events	  are	  in	  the	  fixed	  past	  of	  everything	  else	  that	  exists	  at	  t.	  	  Thus,	  FIXED	  implies	  that	  no	  one	  is	  able—no	  one	  is	  free—to	  do	  anything	  precluded	  by	  those	  events.	   	  The	  implications	  of	  this	  are	  staggering.	   	  No	  one	  acting	  between	  t2	  and	  t1	  is	  able	   to	   refrain	   from	   any	   act	   that	   had	   already	   left	   its	   mark,	   however	   slight,	   on	  something	  that	  had	  left	  its	  mark	  on	  something…that	  had	  left	  its	  mark	  on	  Clare	  by	  the	  time	  she	  stepped	  into	  the	  time	  machine	  in	  2014.	  Stock	  trades,	  political	  actions,	  the	  mundane	   decisions	   of	   all	  manner	   of	   co-­‐workers,	   commuters,	  media	   personalities,	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fans	  at	  sporting	  events,	  and	  so	  on—all	  unfree.	   	  Time	  travel	  destroys	   freedom	  on	  a	  global	  scale.	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